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In this work we consider a model of epidemic spreading coupled with an opinion
dynamics in a fully-connected population. Regarding the opinion dynamics, the
individuals may be in two distinct states, namely in favor or against a vaccination
campaign. Individuals against the vaccination follow a standard SIS model, whereas
the pro-vaccine individuals can also be in a third compartment, namely Vaccinated.
In addition, the opinions change according to the majority-rule dynamics in groups
with three individuals. We also consider that the vaccine can give permanent or
temporary immunization to the individuals. By means of analytical calculations and
computer simulations, we show that the opinion dynamics can drastically affect the
disease propagation, and that the engagement of the pro-vaccine individuals can be
crucial for stopping the epidemic spreading. The full numerical code for simulate
the model is available from the authors’ webpage.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Epidemic spreading and opinion formation are two dynamical processes that have
been atracted the interest of the scientific community in the last decades [1–10]. The interest
of physicists varies from theoretical aspects like critical phenomena [11–16], stochasticity
[17, 18], universality [19] and multiple phase transitions [20], to practical questions like the
detection of the zero patient [21], super spreaders [22], effects of self isolation [23] and others.
More recently, the coupling of epidemic and opinion models have also been considered [24–
27].
Regarding a vaccination campaign in a given population, the individuals consider some
points in order to make the decision to take the vaccine or not. In the case when a consid-
erable fraction of the population decides to not take the vaccine, the consequences for the
whole population may be drastic. As an example, in 2010 the French govenment requested
vaccine for H1N1 for 90 million individuals, but about 6 million of the vaccines were effec-
tively used by the population, and in this case the disease has spread fast [28]. In this case,
one can see that the public opinion can be a key feature in the diffusion of a disease in a
given population, promoting the occurrence or the lack of an outbreak.
The public opinion about vaccination can be affected by economic factors. For example,
we have a competition between the “cost” to become vaccinated (collateral effects, required
time to take the vaccine, ...) and the injury caused by the disease when the individual
did not take the vaccine (medication, money, miss some days of work, ...). In this case,
the usual approach is to consider game theory or epidemiological-economic models [29, 30].
However, usually the individuals/agents do not take into account only economic factors
[24–26, 31–33]. As discussed in [34], “if individuals are social followers, the resulting vacci-
nation coverage would converge to a certain level, depending on individuals’ initial level of
vaccination willingness rather than the associated costs.” In addition, in [35] it is discussed
that “assumptions of economic rationality and payoff maximization are not mandatory for
predicting commonly observed dynamics of vaccination coverage such as the failure to reach
herd immunity and oscillations between high and low levels of coverage”. Related to social
norms, the authors in [36] propose that “including injunctive social norms will enable models
of parental vaccinating behaviour for paediatric infectious diseases to better explain the whole
range of observed vaccinating behaviour, including both va
3coverage levels so commonly observed”.
Indeed, some other works have shown that individuals are influenced by their social
contacts in the process of opinion formation about a vaccination process [37, 38]. In this case,
in this work we consider an opinion formation process coupled with an epidemic dynamics
where vaccination is taking into account. Our target is to investigate how the density
of Infected individuals in short and long times is affected by the social pressure and the
engagement of the individuals regarding the vaccination. Thus, we are interested in answer
some theoretical and practical questions:
(i) What is the effect of social pressure and engagement in the epidemic spreading process?
(ii) What are the conditions for the occurrence of epidemic outbreaks in short times?
(iii) What is the critical initial density of pro-vaccine individuals that can avoid the occur-
rence of such short-time outbreaks?
(iv) The disease will survive in the long-time limit?
The answer for these questions are given in the next sections.
II. MODEL
An individual’s willingness to vaccinate is derived from his perception of disease risk
and vaccine safety. However, the interactions among individuals in small groups will also
affect the decision of the individuals to take or not the vaccine. In this case, we will consider
an epidemic dynamics coupled with an opinion dynamics regarding the vaccination. Thus,
we consider a fully-connected population with N individuals or agents, that can be classified
as follows:
• Opinion states: Pro-vaccine (opinion o = +1) or Anti-vaccine (opinion o = −1)
individuals;
• Epidemic compartments: Susceptible (S), Infected (I) or Vaccinated (V) individuals;
Each opinion is supported by a given fraction of the population, namely f+1 and f−1,
representing the fraction of Pro-vaccine and Anti-vaccine agents, respectively. We define
4the initial density of +1 opinions as D, that is a parameter of the model, and in this case
the density of −1 opinions at the beginning is 1 − D. There are many models of opinion
dynamics in literature [6–8, 16, 28, 39–46], and as a simple modeling of such dynamics we
considered that the opinion changes are ruled by the majority-rule dynamics [39, 46], i.e.,
we choose at random a group of 3 agents. If there is a local majority (2 × 1) in favor of
one of the two possible opinions, the individual with minority opinion will follow the local
majority. In this case, we are considering a mean-field formulation for the opinion dynamics.
In the following we will see that the epidemic dynamics is also defined at a mean-field level.
Despite the simplicity of a mean-field approach, it allows us an analytical treatment, that is
important to a better understanding of a new model. Topologically, the mean-field approach
corresponds to a fully-connected population, where each individual interacts with all others.
In this case, it is also a realistic situation thanks to the modern communication networks
[47]. Finally, it has been discussed that one can capture most of the dynamics of an epidemic
on a real social network using only mean-field calculations [48].
Regarding the epidemic dynamics, we made some assumptions. First of all, the opinion
of an agent about the vaccination process determines his behavior regarding the decision
to take the vaccine or not [6, 9, 24, 25, 29, 31]. As discussed in [31], “after conducting
large scale studies on the acceptance of the Influenza vaccine, Chapman et al. [49] conclude
that perceived side-effects and effectiveness of vaccination are important factors in people’s
decision to vaccinate”. We also considered that at the same time the disease is introduced in
the population, a mass vaccination campaign is started. This is a realistic assumption, since
usually the governements act fast in order to avoid disease outbreaks. For simplicity, we did
not consider competition for doses. Finally, we considered as some authors [35] that both
dynamics (opinion and epidemic) occurs at the same time scale, i.e., the opinions evolve
in the population due to interactions among agents, and at the same time a vaccination
campaign occurs and the individuals may move among the epidemic compartments, that
are defined in more details in the following. All these assumptions simplify the problem and
makes the following analytical treatment easier. Furthermore, they are realistic, and were
also considered by some authors from epidemiologists to mathematicians [6, 31, 35].
Now, let us elaborate upon the coupling of the two distinct dynamics (opinion and epi-
demic). Figure 1 shows an esquematic representation of the dynamics. The Pro-vaccine
agents (opinion o = +1) take the vaccine with probability γ. This parameter can be viewed
5as the engagement of the individuals regarding the vaccination campaign, i.e., it measures
the tendency of an agent to go to the hospital to take a dose of the vaccine. Indeed, many
times the individuals refuse to leave home to take a vaccine due to the time expended to
conclude all the process. In this case, the complementary probability 1 − γ will represent
this “laziness”. In the case a given individual does not take the vaccine, he can become
infected with probability λ if he make a contact with an Infected individual, as in a stan-
dard SIS model [50, 51]. In the same way, an Infected individual becomes Susceptible again
with probability α. Considering the Vaccinated agents, we considered that the vaccine is not
permanent, so a vaccinated agent becomes susceptible again with rate φ, the resusceptibility
probability [52, 53]. Summarizing, the individuals with opinion o = +1 can undergo the
following transitions among the epidemic compartments:
• S → V : each Susceptible and Pro-vaccine individual becomes Vaccinated with prob-
ability γ;
• S → I: each Susceptible and Pro-vaccine individual becomes Infected with probability
(1− γ)λ if he is in contact with an Infected agent.
On the other hand, the agents against the vaccination process do not take the vaccine.
In this case, they follow a standard SIS dynamics, with infection probability λ and recovery
probability α [50, 51]. Finally, the common transitions among states for both agents (o = +1
and o = −1) are given by
• I → S: each Infected individual recovers and becomes susceptible again with proba-
bility α;
• V → S: each Vaccinated individual becomes Susceptible again with the resusceptibil-
ity probability φ, since the vaccine wears off [52].
As discussed above, as initial conditions we considered a fraction D (1−D) of individuals
carrying the opinion o = +1 (o = −1) at t = 0. In addition, 1% of the individuals start
the dynamics in the Infected state, and the remaining 99% in the Susceptible compartment.
We considered synchronous update schemes for opinion and epidemic dynamics, i.e., both
the transitions among the opinions and among the epidemic compartments are updated in
a parallel way. For each simulation time step, the algorithm is as follows:
6FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the model. It is shown the opinion dynamics of the Pro-
vaccine (P) and Anti-vaccine (A) individuals, based on the majority rule (left panel), as well as
the epidemic dynamics based on a compartmental model (right panel).
• We visit every site i in sequential order, and for each site i we choose at random other
two sites j and k. Then we apply the majority rule to each group of 3 agents (i, j, k).
• the opinions are updated using a parallel scheme;
• after the opinion dynamics, we visit every site in a sequential order;
• we apply the epidemic dynamics’ rules to each agent;
• the epidemic states of the individuals are updated using a parallel scheme.
For the epidemic dynamics, the numerical procedure is as follows. For a spontaneous
transition (with no contact, for example S → V or I → S), the associated probability (γ
and α for the mentioned transitions, respectively) is compared with a uniformly distributed
random number. In the case where a direct contact is needed, for example if we take a
Susceptible agent, as we are considering a fully-connected network we choose at random
another agent. If this agent is Infected, the transition S → I occurs with probability λ. For
more details of the numerical procedure, see [54].
The mean-field equations for the model can be written as
d S
dt
= −γ S f+1 − (1− γ) λS I f+1 − λS I f−1 + α I + φ V , (1)
d I
dt
= (1− γ)λS I f+1 + λS I f−1 − α I , (2)
d V
dt
= γS f+1 − φ V , (3)
7where S, I and V are the fractions of Susceptibles, Infected and Vaccinated individuals,
respectively. All the analytical calculations are performed in details in the Appendix A.
In the following section we discuss the main analytical results and the outcomes of our
simulations.
III. RESULTS
After the definition of the model, one can start to answer the four questions formu-
lated at the end of the Introduction. As we are considering a fully-connected network, we
considered the above mean-field equations to analyze the system, Eqs. (1) - (3), with spe-
cial attention to the stationary properties of the model. We also considered an agent-based
modelling of the system, since the individuals (agents) are the primary subject in a social
theory [55]. For this purpose, we considered populations with N = 104 agents, and for sake
of simplicity and without loss of generality 1., we fixed the recovery probability α = 0.2 in all
simulations. Considering the stationary states of the model, all of our results are averaged
over 100 independent simulations in order to obtain better statistics.
In the following we will consider separately the short-time and the long-time behavior of
the system.
A. Short-time behavior
Let’s start with the short-time behavior of the model, which allows us to analyze
the question (i) made in the Introduction. As discussed in the previous section, our initial
conditions are I(0) = Io = 0.01, S(0) = So = 0.99, V (0) = Vo = 0.0, f+1(0) = D and
f−1(0) = 1−D. Thus, one can derive an analytical expression for the effective reproductive
number Re through Eq. (2),
d I
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= (1− γ)λSo Io f+1(0) + λSo Io f−1(0)− α Io = Io α (Re − 1) , (4)
where Re is given by
Re = (1− γD)So
λ
α
. (5)
1 As it is usual in epidemic models, we verified that the effect of variation of α is small in the dynamics
8FIG. 2. Diagram of possible short-time epidemic scenarios as a function of the critical density Dc.
We considered Eqs. (6) and (7) with parameters So = 0.99, Io = 0.01, α = 0.2, and λ was varied
from 0 to 1. In this case, we obtained RSISe in the range [0, 4.95].
Notice that the above expression depends on the initial fraction D of Pro-vaccine agents and
on the engagement γ, and it does not depend on the resusceptibility probability φ. In other
words, Eq. (5) exhibits explicitly the coupling of the opinion and epidemic dynamics, includ-
ing the usual dependence of the effective reproduction number Re on the initial condition
So. If So = 1 we have the basic reproduction ratio Ro that is defined as the average number
of individuals one infectious person would infect (over their entire period of infectiousness)
if everyone in the population were susceptible [56].
Looking for Eq. (5), one can see that the occurrence of an outbreak decays for increasing
values of γ and D. In this case, the initial fraction of vaccine supporters and the people
engagement are important keys in the prevention of outbreaks, that is a realistic feature of
the model. Observe that for γ = 0 (no vaccination), the above expression (5) recovers the
usual SIS result, RSISe = So λ/α.
In order to compare both expression for the effective reproductive number, one can rewrite
Eq. (5) as
Re = (1− γD)R
SIS
e . (6)
To avoid an epidemic outbreak, Re ≤ 1, which implies that D ≥ (1/γ)(1 − 1/R
SIS
e ). In
9this case, one can define a critical density Dc as
Dc =
1
γ
(
1−
1
RSISe
)
. (7)
Figure 2 exhibits a diagram that help us to answer the question (ii) pointed in the Intro-
duction, as discussed in the following:
1. Red region (Dc ≤ 0): in this region the solution (7) is mathematically valid but it
presents no physical meaning. It indicates that the outbreak does not occur due to
purely epidemic reasons, i.e., we have RSISe < 1 since So λ < α;
2. Green region (0 < Dc ≤ 0.5): in this region the initial minority is favorable to the
vaccination. However, this minority can avoid the epidemic outbreak, and one can see
the power of the initial minority in the short time [8, 57, 58].
3. Blue region (0.5 ≤ Dc < 1): in this region, the initial majority is in favor of the
vaccination. Thus, depending on the engagement of such majority the outbreak can
be avoided, and one can see the power of the initial majority in the short time [57, 58].
4. Purple region (Dc ≥ 1): in this region the solution (7) is also not physically acceptable.
It indicates that the outbreak can not be avoided, even if 100% of the population is
in favor of the vaccination. Values Dc ≥ 1 are obtained if the people engagement is
too low.
Those last results answer the questions (ii) and (iii) made in the Introduction.
B. Long-time behavior
In this section we analyze the long-time behavior of the model, i.e., its steady-state
properties, and one can discuss the question (iv) pointed in the Introduction. As we will
see in the following, in opposition to what happend in the short-time case, the stationary
behavior of the model depends on the resusceptibility probability φ. In this case, we will
study separately the two cases φ 6= 0 and φ = 0.
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1. Vaccination with limited efficiency (φ 6= 0)
For the case with temporary immunity φ 6= 0, one can obtain all the fractions of the
epidemic states in the limit t→∞ (see Appendix A). The stationary density of Vaccinated
and Susceptible individuals are given, respectively, by
V∞ =


0 if D < 0.5
γ
φ
α
(1−γ) λ
if D > 0.5
(8)
S∞ =


α
λ
if D < 0.5
α
λ (1−γ)
if D > 0.5
(9)
On the other hand, the stationary density of Infected individuals is given by
I∞ =


0 if λ ≤ λIc and D < 0.5 or λ ≤ λ
II
c and D > 0.5
1
λ
(λ− λIc) if λ > λ
I
c and D < 0.5
1
λ
(λ− λIIc ) if λ > λ
II
c and D > 0.5
(10)
where the epidemic thresholds for the cases D < 0.5 and D > 0.5 are, respectively,
λIc = α , (11)
λIIc = α
φ+ γ
φ (1− γ)
. (12)
Equations (11) and (12) show that effect of the social pressure is twofold. For D < 0.5, the
social pressure has a negative effect, in a way that it eliminates from the threshold λIc the
effect of the engagement γ of the Pro-vaccine individuals. On the other hand, for D > 0.5
the social pressure has a positive effect, since the contribution of the engagement γ appears
explicitly in the epidemic threshold λIIc . The effect of the engagement can be analyzed in
more details as follows. Taking λIIc = 1 in Eq. (12) we found a threshold value
γ∗ =
φ (1− α)
φ+ α
. (13)
This value γ∗ is the engagement above which there is no endemic phase in the system.
In Figure 3 we exhibit some analytical and numerical results. In Figures 3 (a) and (b)
we show typical results for the stationary density of Infected individuals I∞ for D < 0.5
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FIG. 3. Typical shape of the stationary density I∞ of Infected individuals as a function of λ for
D < 0.5 (a) and D > 0.5 (b). We considered α = 0.2, φ = 0.1 and γ = 0.2. The line is the
analytical result Eq. (10) and the points were obtained from simulations using D = 0.4 (a) and
D = 0.6 (b). (c) Typical phase diagram λ versus γ for D > 0.5 given by Eq. (12). The parameters
are φ = 0.1 and α = 0.2. (d) Typical phase diagram γ versus φ for D > 0.5 given by Eq. (13).
The parameter is α = 0.2.
and D > 0.5, respectively. The full lines are given by the solutions (10), with the respective
epidemic thresholds given by Eqs. (11) and (12), and the symbols are results of numerical
simulations of the model. In those figures one can see the phase transition between a Disease-
free phase, where the disease disappears of the population after a long time, and an Endemic
phase, where the disease survives and infects permanently a finite fraction of the population
in the stationary state. According to Eq. (10), in comparison with the standard form
I∞ ∼ (λ− λc)
β, we obtain a mean-field exponent β = 1, as expected due to the mean-field
character of our model. In other words, a typical active-absorbing nonequilibrium phase
transition.
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The critical points λc do not depend explicitly on the initial density of Pro-vaccine agents,
see Eqs. (11) and (12). However, for better understanding of the dynamics, it is important
to analyze what is the initial minority opinion. For D < 0.5, after a long time the Pro-
vaccine agents (opinion o = +1) will disappear of the population, so their engagement is
not relevant in this case. On the other hand, for D > 0.5 the opposite occurs, in the steady
state all agents will share the opinion o = +1. Thus, during the evolution of the dynamics,
when the fraction of Pro-vaccine agents is increasing in time, an increase in the engagement
probability γ contributes to the extinction of the disease, or in other words to the increase of
the Disease-free phase. This behavior can be observed in Eq. (12): when we increase γ the
critical point λIIc increases, and the endemic (disease-free) phase becomes smaller (larger).
This picture can be seen in Figure 3 (c), where we plot Eq. (12) as a function of γ. Let
us consider the points A, B and C in this figure. If there is an effort (public policies, for
example) to increase the engagement of the people in favor of vaccination from γ = 0.1
(point A) to γ = 0.2 (point B), the disease will disappear after a long time. In addition,
if the engagement rises again, for γ = 0.3 (point C), there is no Endemic phase anymore,
independent of the infection rate λ, since in this region of the figure we have λc > 1. These
results indicate that even for highly contagious diseases the Pro-vaccine movement can stops
the epidemic spreading, provided that the related agents are sufficiently engaged.
In this case, other question immediately arises: the above-mentioned absence of an En-
demic phase is robust under variations in the resusceptibility probability φ? The graphic in
Figure 3 (d), where it is plotted Eq. (13), answers this question. Indeed, for a sufficient high
engagement one obtains the absence of the Endemic phase, independent of the vaccine’s
imperfection φ. Nevertheless, one can also see in Figure 3 (d) that for increasing values of φ
it is necessary more engagement in order to eliminate the disease propagation, which is also
a realistic result of the model.
In Figure 4 we exhibit numerical results for D = 0.75, i.e., for an initial majority of agents
supporting the vaccination process. In this case, the opinion dynamics leads the system to a
steady state were all agents follow this initial majority. Even in this case, a small engagement
of the individuals like γ = 0.1 is not sufficient to avoid an epidemic outbreak (Re = 2.64 > 1
and λ = 0.6 > λc = 0.44), and in addition the disease survives in the population in the
long-time limit. On the other hand, for γ = 0.5 we have a disease-free equilibrium after a
long time, but the outbreak still occurs (Re = 1.78 > 1 and λ = 0.6 < λc = 0.75). Finally,
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FIG. 4. Temporal evolution of the densities of Pro-vaccine (f+1), Susceptible (S), Infected (I) and
Vaccinated (V) individuals, obtained from numerical simulations of the model for γ = 0.1 (a),
γ = 0.5 (b) and γ = 0.9 (c). The other parameters are λ = 0.6, φ = 0.1, D = 0.75, N = 104,
Io = 0.05, So = 0.95, Vo = 0. From Eqs. (5) and (12), we obtain (a) Re = 2.64 and λc = 0.44, (b)
Re = 1.78 and λc = 0.75, (c) Re = 0.93 and λc = 20.0.
for a sufficient high engagement like γ = 0.9, the outbreak does not occurs (Re = 0.93 < 1
and λ = 0.6 < λc = 20.0), the epidemic disappears in few time steps of the population, and
we have a disease-free equilibrium in the long-time limit.
2. Vaccination with permanent immunization (φ = 0)
For the case with permanent immunity φ = 0, one can obtain only some analytical
results for the fractions of the epidemic states, in the limit t → ∞ (see Appendix A). The
stationary density of Vaccinated, Susceptible and Infected individuals are given, respectively,
by
14
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
λ
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
I ∞
D=0.0
D=0.2
D=0.4
γ = 0.1
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
λ
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
I ∞
D=0.0
D=0.2
D=0.4
γ = 0.5
(b)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
λ
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
I ∞
D=0.0
D=0.2
D=0.4
γ = 0.9
(c)
FIG. 5. Stationary density I∞ of Infected individuals as a function of λ for typical values of
D = 0.0, 0.2 and 0.4. The numerical results where obtained for φ = 0 (permanent immunization)
and γ = 0.1 (a), γ = 0.5 (b) and γ = 0.9 (c). The population size is N = 104 and data are averaged
over 100 independent simulations.
V∞ =


V∞ if D < 0.5
1 if D > 0.5
(14)
S∞ =


α
λ
if D < 0.5
0 if D > 0.5
(15)
I∞ =


0 if D > 0.5 or D < 0.5 and (1− V∞)λ ≤ α
1− V∞ −
α
λ
if D < 0.5 and (1− V∞)λ ≥ α
(16)
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As one can see, for φ = 0 the above equations furnish only the exact solution for S∞,
and a relation between I∞ and V∞ This is a consequence of the compartment V , that
for φ = 0 is an absorbing state, i.e., if an agent enters in this compartment he will not
change his epidemic state anymore. In this case, we will focus our study mainly in computer
simulations. However, the above analytical results can give us some insights in the behavior
of the model. First of all, Eq. (16) predicts a phase transition. On the other hand, one
can see from Eq. (14)-(16) that if the initial majority is formed by Pro-vaccine individuals
(D > 0.5), the disease will disapear after a long time, since the vaccine induces a permanent
immunization and more agents become in favor of the vaccination during the evolution of
the system.
In Figure 5 we show numerical results for the stationary density I∞ of Infected individuals
as a function of λ for typical values of γ and D, with φ = 0. One can see that the epidemic
threshold λc increases for increasing values of D. In addition, one can see that when we
increase D from D = 0.0 to D = 0.2, the impact on the behavior of I∞ is small, whereas
the effect is more pronounced when we change from D = 0.2 to D = 0.4. This effect is more
clear when we increase the engagement γ, see for example Figure 5 (c).
We exhibit in Figure 6 numerical results for the temporal evolution of the densities of
Pro-vaccine (f+1), Susceptible (S), Infected (I) and Vaccinated (V) individuals for φ = 0.
Results are for D = 0.6 (a), D = 0.45 (b) and D = 0.3 (c), and the fixed parameters are
λ = 0.7 and γ = 0.9. In the panel (a) one can see that even if the vaccination supporters
are initially a majority (D = 0.6), they cannot avoid the occurrence of the outbreak (since
Re > 1), but they can promote the disappearance of the disease in the long-time limit.
Nevertheless, due to the initial majority in favor of vaccination, the outbreak achieves a
small fraction of the individuals. In Figure 6 (b) there is a small initial majority against
the vaccination (D = 0.45). Despite the occurrence of an epidemic outbreak (since Re > 1),
one can see an interesting result: the disease disappears in the long-time limit, even in
this case (D < 0.5) where after a long time all the individuals in the population will share
the anti-vaccine opinion o = −1. This result occurs due to the high engagement of the
population, γ = 0.9, i.e., even being a minority in all the evolution of the system the Pro-
vaccine individuals take the vaccine with a high probability, and the immunity is permanent.
In this case, even when these individuals change opinion due to the social pressure, they are
already vaccinated.
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FIG. 6. Temporal evolution of the densities of Pro-vaccine (f+1), Susceptible (S), Infected (I) and
Vaccinated (V) individuals, obtained from numerical simulations of the model with permanent
immunization (φ = 0). Results are for D = 0.6 (a), D = 0.45 (b) and D = 0.3 (c). The other
parameters are λ = 0.7, γ = 0.9, N = 104, Io = 5%, So = 95%, Vo = 0%. From Eq. (6) one obtains
Re = 1.53 (a), Re = 1.98 (b) and Re = 2.43 (c).
Finally, in the panel (c) of Figure 6 we show results for D = 0.3, i.e., the great majority of
the population (70%) starts the dynamics against the vaccination process. In this case, one
can see that the outbreak occurs (since Re > 1) and the disease survives in the stationary
state. This occurs due to the rapid population consensus against the vaccination, and even
for a high engagement the pro-vaccine agents disappear rapidly of the population due to
social pressure.
For better analyze the effect of social pressure in the epidemic spreading, we exhibit in
Figure 7 the stationary density I∞ of Infected individuals as a function of the initial density
D of +1 opinions, for typical values of infection probability λ and of the engagement γ.
First of all, one can see that, if the initial majority is in favor of the vaccination campaign
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FIG. 7. Stationary density I∞ of Infected individuals as a function of the initial density D of pro-
vaccine agents for typical values of the engagement γ and permanent immunity (φ = 0). Results
are for infection probabilities λ = 0.25 (a), λ = 0.50 (b) and λ = 0.75 (c). The vertical (green)
dotted line indicates the value D = 0.5, that separates the regions of initial majorities in favor and
against the vaccination process. The population size is N = 104 and data are averaged over 100
independent simulations.
(D > 0.5), the disease disappears of the population in the steady state, independent of the
values of γ and λ, as predicted analytically in Eqs. (14)-(16). This is a positive effect of
the social pressure [36, 59, 60]. On the other hand, for small values of D (D <≈ 0.15) the
density of Infected agents is independent of γ, for a fixed value of λ. In other words, if
the the population is initially mainly dominated by individuals against the vaccination, the
engagement has no effect on the disease propagation, and we have an endemic phase. In
this case, the social pressure causes a negative effect on the disease spreading [36, 59, 60].
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However, one can see in Figure 7 an interesting result for the cases with D < 0.5: despite
the mentioned negative effect of social pressure, a sufficient high engagement like γ = 0.9
can lead to the disease extinction in the stationary state, since the initial majority of anti-
vaccine individuals is not much larger than the initial minority of pro-vaccince agents. This
result can be observed in the three graphics of Figure 7, and is more pronounced for the
smaller values of the infection probability λ. These results can be seen as a kind of power
of the minority in the long-time limit. All those results are realistic features of our model.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this work, we have studied a model of epidemic spreading coupled with an opinion
dynamics. Such opinion dynamics simulates the competition of two distinct positions regard-
ing a vaccination campaign: pro-vaccine x anti-vaccine individuals. As a minimal model,
we considered that this competition is represented in our case by the Galam’s majority-rule
dynamics [39, 46]. In addition, the epidemic dynamics is governed by a compartmental
model with 3 classes: Susceptibles (S), Infected (I) and Vaccinated (V) individuals. Finally,
we considered two distinct cases: the vaccine can give temporary or permanent immunity
to the individuals.
For both cases, one can describe the model at mean-field level through ordinary differential
equations. First, we analyzed the short-time behavior of the model, and we found that
it does not depend on the resusceptibility rate φ, the probability for which a vaccinated
individual becomes susceptible again. We calculated the effective reproductive number Re,
that is given by Re = (1 − γD)So (λ/α). This expression shows that the occurrence or
absence of an epidemic outbreak depends on the infection and recovery probabilities (λ and
α, respectively), as usual, but it also depends on social parameters. The first one is the
initial fraction D of pro-vaccine individuals, and the other one is the engagement γ of those
individuals. Thus, the coupling of both dynamics (opinion and epidemic) affects directly
the disease diffusion in the short time. Based on the expression for Re, we discussed the
range of values of D for which different realistic scenarios can occur. In this case, we found
evidences that even an initial minority in favor of the vaccination campaign (D < 0.5) can
stop the disease spreading, since its engagement is sufficiently high (the power of the initial
minority). In addition, for the case where the pro-vaccine individuals are majority in the
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beginning (D > 0.5), even the outbreak can be avoided, depending on the values of γ (the
power of the initial majority).
On the other hand, the long-time behavior of the model depends on φ. For the cases
where the immunity is temporary, we found all the stationary densities (S, I and V). Based
on these results, we verified that the model undergoes phase transitions between disease-free
and endemic phases, and the epidemic thresholds are different for the two cases of initial
majorities (D < 0.5 and D > 0.5). Thus, we found that for D < 0.5 the transition does not
depends on φ, which suggests that if the initial majority is against the vaccination process,
the engagement does not influence the disease spreading. On the other hand, for D > 0.5
the threshold depends explicity on φ, and we found that for sufficient high engagement the
disease can disappear of the population in the long time, even for high infection rates. We
also derived an analytical expression for the threshold value γ∗ above which there is no
endemic phase in the population.
For the cases where the immunity is permanent, we only derived a closed analytical ex-
pression for the stationary density of Susceptible agents S∞. The expression for I∞ depends
on V∞, and we can conclude from that expressions only that there is a phase transition as
in the previous case, and that if the initial majority is formed by Pro-vaccine individuals
(D > 0.5), the disease will disapear after a long time, since the vaccine induces a permanent
immunization and more agents become in favor of the vaccination during the evolution of
the system due to the social pressure (majority-rule dynamics). This is a positive effect of
the social pressure. The remaining of the analysis for permanent immunization was done
through Monte Carlo simulations. In this case, we also found distinct epidemic scenarios,
with endemic and disease-free phases, and the occurrence or not of outbreaks. In addi-
tion, we verified that if there is initially an overwhelming majority of anti-vaccine agents
(D << 0.5), the engagement has no effect on the disease propagation, and we have an
endemic phase, which can be interpreted as a negative effect of the social pressure on the
disease spreading. However, even for D < 0.5 a sufficient high engagement can lead to the
disease extinction in the stationary state, since the initial majority of anti-vaccine individ-
uals is not much larger than the initial minority of pro-vaccince agents. These results can
be seen as a kind of power of the minority in the long-time limit. All these those results are
realistic features of our model.
As discussed in [53] the variation of the epidemic threshold as a result of immunization
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has important practical consequences. In our case, for φ 6= 0 (temporary immunity), one
can see in Figure 3 (c) that near the engagement threshold γ∗ a small effort to increase the
engagement of pro-vaccine individuals leads the system to a disease-free phase, or even to
the absence of an endemic phase (i.e., there is no endemic phase even for λ = 1.0). It means
that in a given population where the initial majority supports the vaccination campaign
(D > 0.5), the focus of the government should be to promote a higher engagement of such
initial majority. This conclusion corroborates the discussion in [61], that indicates that in
general the better strategy in a vaccination campaign is not to direct “battle” with anti-
vaccine individuals. On the other hand, for D < 0.5 our results suggest that the increase
of engagement should not be sufficient to eliminate the disease. In this case, the more
efficient strategy is to change the initial conditions, i.e., to convincing more floaters prior
to the beginning of the public debate, as discussed by Galam in [28]. Finally, for φ = 0.0
(permanent immunity), the Galam’s strategy [28] could present evident or neglibible results,
depending on the initial fraction of pro-vaccine agents and on their engagement.
Summarizing, our results showed that for both analyzed cases (permanent or temporary
immunity) the social pressure acts either positively and negatively over the epidemic spread-
ing in our SIS-like model, depending on the initial density of pro-vaccine individuals. Other
works [34–36, 59, 60] also discussed that the social pressure acts as a double-edged sword in
vaccination campaigns, but in the mentioned works the authors considered SIR models and
they did not take into account the two vaccination schemes considered here (permanent or
temporary immunity).
As extensions of this work, one can simulate the model on complex topologies (small
world, scale free) in order to analyze the impact of the neighborhood in the dynamics
presented here in the fully-connected case. Another interesting extension is to consider more
sofisticated dynamics for the opinions’ changes, taking into account agents’ heterogeneities
(conviction, for example [62]) as well as other interesting models as the nonlinear voter
model [44] and the nonconsensus opinion model [45].
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Appendix A
The model is definied by the set of ODE’s (1), (2) and (3) of the text. In addition,
we have the normalization condition S + V + I = 1.
1. Short time
The condition for the epidemic threshold can be obtained from Eq. (2) taking t = 0,
dI
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= (1− γ)λSo Io f+1(0) + λSo Io f−1(0)− α Io
= (1− γ) λSo IoD + λSo Io (1−D)− α Io
= Io α((1− γ D)So
λ
α
− 1)
= Io α (Re − 1) (A1)
Comparing the last expression with Eq. (4), we have Re = (1− γ D)So λ/α, that is Eq. (5)
of the text.
2. Long time and φ 6= 0
a. Case I: D < 0.5
The steady state of the opinion dynamics is f+1 = 0 and f−1 = 1 [39, 46], i.e., all
agents are Anti-vaccine after a long time. For the epidemic states, the limit t→∞ for Eqs.
(1), (2) and (3) of the text gives us
˙S∞ = 0 = −λS∞ I∞ + α I∞ + φ V∞ , (A2)
˙I∞ = 0 = λS∞ I∞ − α I∞ , (A3)
˙V∞ = 0 = φ V∞ . (A4)
Eq. (A4) for φ 6= 0 gives us V∞ = 0. From Eq. (A3) we obtain two solutions,
I∞ = 0 , (A5)
S∞ =
α
λ
. (A6)
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Considering the normalization condition, the solution V∞ = 0 and the results (A5) and (A6),
one obtains
I∞ =


0 λ ≤ λc
1
λ
(λ− λc) λ > λc
(A7)
where λc = λ
I
c = α is the epidemic threshold for D < 0.5, Eq. (11) of the text.
b. Case II: D > 0.5
In this case, the steady state of the opinion dynamics is f+1 = 1 and f−1 = 0 [39, 46],
i.e., all agents are Pro-vaccine. For the epidemic states, the limit t → ∞ for Eqs. (1), (2)
and (3) of the text gives us
˙S∞ = 0 = −γ S∞ − (1− γ) λS∞ I∞ + α I∞ + φ V∞ , (A8)
˙I∞ = 0 = (1− γ) λS∞ I∞ − α I∞ , (A9)
˙V∞ = 0 = γ S∞ − φ V∞ . (A10)
Eq. (A9) gives us
I∞ = 0 , (A11)
S∞ =
α
(1− γ) λ
. (A12)
Considering Eqs. (A10) and (A12), one gets for φ 6= 0
V∞ =
γ
φ
α
(1− γ) λ
. (A13)
Using the normalization condition, one obtains
I∞ =
1
λ
(
λ− α
φ+ γ
φ (1− γ)
)
. (A14)
Comparing this last result with the standard form I∞ ∼ (λ− λc)
β, one obtains λc = λ
II
c =
α φ+γ
φ (1−γ)
, that is the epidemic threshold for D > 0.5, Eq. (12) of the text, and the typical
mean-field exponent β = 1.
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3. Long time and φ = 0
a. Case I: D < 0.5
In a similiar way as we made before, the steady-state equations are given by
˙S∞ = 0 = −λS∞ I∞ + α I∞ , (A15)
˙I∞ = 0 = λS∞ I∞ − α I∞ , (A16)
˙V∞ = 0 = 0 V∞ . (A17)
Eq. (A17) is identically null, and in this case we have a set of two equations with three
variables, i.e., there is not complete solution. However, from Eq. (A16) we have I∞ = 0 or
S∞ = α/λ. The normalization condition gives us the general solution
I∞ =


0 λ ≤ λc
1− α
λ
− V∞ λ > λc
(A18)
and one can not obtain an explicity result for the epidemic threshold λc, since V∞ can be a
function of λ.
b. Case II: D > 0.5
In a similiar way as we made before, the steady-state equations are given by
˙S∞ = 0 = −γS∞ − (1− γ)λS∞I∞ + αI∞ , (A19)
˙I∞ = 0 = (1− γ)λS∞I∞ − αI∞ , (A20)
˙S∞ = 0 = γS∞ . (A21)
For γ 6= 0 one gets S∞ = I∞ = 0, and the normalization conditions gives us V∞ = 1.
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